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Privacy protection is a defining characteristic of Swiss culture and a
pillar of the Swiss economy. For centuries, the Swiss people have coveted
the principles of individual privacy, regularly reaffirming those principles
in response to referendums designed to limit them. Swiss banking secrecy,
one aspect of privacy, is protected by Swiss criminal and civil laws and
professional duties. Swiss banks pride themselves on protecting customer
identity and have leveraged their legal and cultural commitment to secrecy
to gain a competitive advantage in the global banking market. As of March
2009, Swiss banks held an estimated $2 trillion in foreign assets, which
amounted to 27% of global assets held abroad.'
In early 2009, the foundation of the Swiss banking industry was
shaken-if not cracked-by events occurring halfway around the world in
* Bradley J. Bondi is counsel to a commissioner at the U.S. Securities and Exchange
Conmission (SEC) and an adjunct professor at Georgetown University Law Center and
George Mason University School of Law. The SEC, as a matter of policy, disclaims
responsibility for any private publication or statement by any of its employees. The views
expressed herein are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the
Commission, any commissioner, the author's colleagues on the staff of the Commission, or
any other person or organization.
1 David Crawford & Jesse Drucker, Swiss To Relax Bank Secrecy Laws, WALL ST. J.,
Mar. 14, 2009, at A5; Warren Giles & Dylan Griffiths, Swiss Banks Court New Markets,
Shun Americans as Secrecy Erodes, BLOOMBERG, Aug. 20, 2009,
http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=20601085&sid=a9qFQwi3phwo [hereinafter
Swiss Banks Court New Markets].
1
Northwestern Journal of
International Law & Business 30:1 (2010)
the United States. Federal prosecutors in the United States alleged that
Swiss banking giant UBS aided Americans in committing criminal tax
fraud. Under intense pressure by United States prosecutors and with the
reluctant acquiescence of the Swiss banking regulator, UBS entered into a
deferred prosecution agreement in which it paid a fine of $780 million and
agreed to disclose the identities of, and account information for, 250 to 300
United States customers of UBS's cross-border business.2 Following
UBS's transfer of the account information, Switzerland's president, Hans-
Rudolf Merz, announced to the world that "[b]anking secrecy . .. remains
intact" and that the Swiss government will not relent in protecting
confidential bank accounts.
The next day, however, the United States government made a
surprising move by filing a lawsuit against UBS to enforce an Internal
Revenue Service (IRS) summons from July 1, 2008, that would force UBS
to reveal the names of 52,000 American customers., UBS had been
specifically permitted under the deferred prosecution agreement to
challenge the July 1, 2008, IRS summons, 5 and UBS immediately indicated
that it would do so. 6 On the eve of a showdown in federal court, UBS and
the United States government announced on July 31, 2009 that they had
reached an agreement in principle to resolve the pending dispute by UBS
providing information for approximately 9% of the 52,000 account holders
sought. Commentators opined that production of information for the
2 Press Release, U.S. Dep't of Justice, UBS Enters into Deferred Prosecution Agreement
(Feb. 18, 2009), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/opa/pr/2009/February/09-tax- 136.html;
David Voreacos & Carlyn Kolker, U.S. Sues UBS Seeking Swiss Account Customer Names,
BLOOMBERG, Feb. 19, 2009,
http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=20601087&sid=a TaQP5WVZuA&refer-home.
Imogen Foulkes, Clock Ticking for Swiss Bank Secrecy, BBC NEWS, Feb. 20, 2009,
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hilbusiness/7901832.stm.
4 Devlin Barrett, U.S. Steps Up Pressure on UBS in Bank Secrets Case, ASSOCIATED
PRESS, Feb. 19, 2009, http://abcnews.go.com/Business/wireStory?id=6912989. The number
of accounts was revised upward to 52,000 from the prior day when the government alleged
there were close to 20,000 United States clients that hid assets through UBS's program.
UBS has indicated that it has turned over only 250 to 300 names. Id.
5 Deferred Prosecution Agreement at 9, para. 13, United States v. UBS AG, No. 09-
60033 (S.D. Fla. Feb. 18, 2009), available at
http://www.usdoj.gov/tax/UBSSignedDeferredProsecutionAgreement.pdf [hereinafter
Deferred Prosecution Agreement].
6 Voreacos & Kolker, supra note 2. In response, the Swiss People's Party (SVP) called
for retaliation against the United States and an urgent debate in parliament on ways to
protect Swiss banking secrecy from "further foreign blackmail." Emma Thomasson, Swiss
Party Wants To Punish US. for UBS Probe, REUTERS, Feb. 21, 2009,
http://www.reuters.com/article/rbssFinancialServicesAndRealEstateNews/idUSTHO150174
20090221.
Graham Bowley, A Privileged World Begins To Give Up Its Secrets, N.Y. TIMEs, Aug.
22, 2009, at WK3; Sven Egenter, UBS Not To Pay Fine in U.S. Tax Settlement: Reports,
REUTERS, Aug. 2, 2009,
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majority of the 52,000 names would have amounted to the end of Swiss
bank secrecy.8 IRS Commissioner Douglas Shulman said the agreement
"blows a big hole in bank secrecy."9 The Swiss newspaper Tages Anzeiger
called the UBS affair "the death knell" for Swiss banking secrecy.'o
This brief Article discusses the Swiss banking laws that prohibit a
Swiss bank from disclosing client information even if those Swiss laws are
at odds with United States law. The Article then provides an overview of
the UBS matter. Finally, the Article briefly analyzes the UBS dispute over
the account information under a conflicts of law framework to hypothesize
on the outcome had the matter been decided by the court. " Analyzing the
UBS dispute may prove useful in predicting the outcome of inevitable
future disputes between the United States government and global banks
over confidential client information.12
II. OVERVIEW OF SWISS BANK SECRECY LAWS
The Swiss people have protected Swiss banking secrecy primarily
through banking laws, criminal laws, civil laws, and codes of professional
obligation.' 3  Of these authorities, the primary source of law establishing
and protecting bank secrecy is the Swiss Federal Banking Act of 1934,
http://www.reuters.com/article/newsOne/idUSTRE57101320090802?pageNumber-2&virtua
lBrandChannel=0&sp-true.




9 Kathleen Pender, Networth: UBS Case Weakens Swiss Bank Secrecy, S.F. CHRON.,
Aug. 23, 2009, at Dl.
10 Foulkes, supra note 3.
1 A conflicts of law analysis is highly dependent on the facts. The facts relied upon in
this Article were obtained exclusively from public court filings and newspaper articles.
Because many of the key facts surrounding the UBS dispute are not publicly available, the
analysis set forth herein is unavoidably incomplete. Therefore, this brief Article is intended
merely to highlight some of the considerations that a court might have weighed in reaching a
decision. The Article should not be viewed as a definitive source for predicting the outcome
in the specific UBS dispute. Moreover, any description or interpretation of Swiss law in this
Article is provided merely as background for the reader. This Article should not be relied
upon as a source of Swiss law, given that the author is not admitted to practice in any Swiss
canton or before any Swiss court. Finally, the author takes no position with respect to the
merits of the United States government's criminal or civil prosecutions.
12 In an interview with Bloomberg Television following the settlement with UBS, IRS
Commissioner Douglas Shulman said that the IRS plans to target other financial institutions,
law firms, and entities that help Americans hide assets offshore. Swiss Banks Court New
Markets, supra note 1.
13 Michble Moser, Comment, Switzerland: New Exceptions to Bank Secrecy Laws Aimed
at Money Laundering and Organized Crime, 27 CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L. 321, 324 (1995);
see Peter C. Honegger, Jr., Demystification ofthe Swiss Banking Secrecy and Illumination of
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while other laws address professional secrecy in general.14 Together, these
laws establish the requirement that Swiss banks and their personnel
preserve the privacy of their clients or else face harsh sanctions, including
criminal and civil liability and loss of professional licenses. Swiss banking
laws are not absolute, however; exceptions exist as discussed below.
Swiss banking secrecy is protected by Swiss banking law, which
imposes criminal sanctions for violations. Article 47 of the Swiss Federal
Banking Act of 1934 codifies the professional duty bankers have to
maintain the confidentiality of banking information.15  Criminal
repercussions exist for intentional breach of that duty and civil
repercussions for negligent breach of that duty." Any bank, bank
employee, or agent of a bank that intentionally violates the duty of privacy
faces severe criminal sanctions, including imprisonment.17  In addition,
Swiss laws contain strict prohibitions against foreign attempts to obtain
confidential Swiss banking information. Article 273 of the Swiss Criminal
Code criminalizes as espionage certain disclosure of bank secrets to foreign
governments under the premise that such disclosure may harm the Swiss
economy.18 Because of the harmful effect that disclosure may have on the
14 See Alfadda v. Fenn, 149 F.R.D. 28, 31-33 (S.D.N.Y. 1993).
15 Loi fdd6rale sur les banques et les caisses d'6pargne [LB] [Swiss Federal Banking
Act], Nov. 8, 1934, Recueil syst6matique du droit federal [RO] 952.0, art. 47 (Switz.),
available at http://www.admin.ch/ch/f/rs/9/952.0.fr.pdf [hereinafter Swiss Federal Banking
Act of 1934]. Article 47 states:
Any person who willfully ... (b) in his capacity as organ, officer or employee of a
bank, as auditor or assistant auditor, as member of the Banking Commission,
officer or employee of its secretarial office, violates his duty to observe silence or
the professional secrecy, or whoever induces or attempts to induce a person to
commit such an offense, shall be fined not more than twenty thousand francs,
and/or shall be imprisoned for not longer than six months.... If the offender
acted negligently, the penalty is a fine of not more than ten thousand francs.
Id.
Id. art. 47.
17 Id. In addition, Article 162 of the Swiss Criminal Code "bars the disclosure of
commercial secrets by those legally and contractually obligated to maintain their secrecy."
Schweizerisches Strafgesetzbuch [StGB], Code p6nal suisse [Cp], Codice penale svizzero
[Cp] [Criminal Code] Dec. 21, 1937, RS 311.0, art. 162 (Switz.) [hereinafter Swiss Criminal
Code].
Moser, supra note 13, at 324; Swiss Criminal Code, supra note 17, art. 273. Article
273 states:
Whoever makes accessible a manufacturing or business secret to a foreign official,
agency, or to a foreign organization or private enterprise or to any agents of the
same, shall be punished by imprisonment and in serious cases by penitentiary. In
addition to that penalty, a fine may be imposed.
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Swiss economy, this provision cannot be waived by the client.19
Banking secrecy also is protected by the civil code. Articles 27 and 28
of the Swiss Civil Code provide protection for the privacy rights of
individuals and legal entities. 2 0 All persons who are given insight into the
privacy of others by virtue of their profession (e.g., lawyers, physicians, and
bankers) are legally bound to protect that privacy. 2 1 Article 28 establishes a
private right of action to any aggrieved party.22
As mentioned, Swiss bank secrecy laws are not absolute. In most
instances, a client can consent to the disclosure of his or her information by
a Swiss bank to a third party.23 In addition, Swiss banks are permitted to
divulge bank secrets to Swiss regulators in limited circumstances but not to
foreign authorities. 24 Foreign authorities must request judicial assistance
from the Swiss government by utilizing diplomatic channels.25 A number
of treaties provide avenues that allow the Swiss government to assist26
another country by permitting a Swiss bank to disclose bank secrets.
Until recently, the Swiss government's willingness to provide
assistance to the United States in tax cases has turned on key distinctions
between United States law and Swiss law. Under United States law, a
violation of the Internal Revenue Code generally can be charged as a civil
or criminal violation, regardless of whether the violation is failing to report
income or assets, filing erroneous tax information with the IRS, or lying to
authorities. 27 By contrast, under Swiss law, a failure to report income or
assets for tax purposes is only a civil violation for tax evasion, not a
Id.
19 PESSTALozzI GMUER & HEIZ, BusINEss LAw GUIDE TO SWITZERLAND § 1135 (1991).
20 Honegger, supra note 13, at 2.
21 id
22 Id. Bankers also have an implied duty of discretion, which is rooted in general
contract law, agency law, and a good faith principle set forth in Swiss Civil Code. Id.
23 Alfadda v. Fenn, 149 F.R.D. 28, 32 (S.D.N.Y. 1993).
24 Honegger, supra note 13, at 8. It is important to note, however, that Swiss bank
secrecy laws are not designed to provide a competitive advantage to Swiss banks. The bank
privacy laws of Switzerland apply to all information located within Switzerland, without
regard to the nationality of the bank, account holder, or requesting entity. See Minpeco v.
Conticommodity Servs., Inc., 116 F.R.D. 517, 524 (S.D.N.Y. 1987) ("[T]he bank secrecy
laws ... have the legitimate purpose of protecting commercial privacy inside and outside
Switzerland.").
25 Honegger, supra note 13, at 8.
26 See, e.g., Loi fed6rale sur l'entraide internationale en matibre p6nale [EIMP] [Swiss
Federal Law on International Judicial Assistance in Criminal Matters] Mar. 20, 1981, RS
351.1 (Switz.); Treaty on Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters, U.S.-Switz., May 25,
1973, 27 U.S.T. 2019 (Mar. 20, 1967).
27 See generally I.R.C. §§ 1-9833 (2008). The IRS most often charges tax-related
criminal offenses under the tax evasion statute (I.R.C. § 7201), the statute addressing the
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criminal violation for tax fraud.28  As a result, the Swiss government
traditionally has permitted disclosure of information to the United States
government only where the equivalent of criminal tax fraud has occurred
under Swiss law, not mere tax evasion.29
In early 2009, the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and
Development (OECD), a voluntary organization composed of 30 member
nations, 30 placed member-nation Switzerland on its "grey list" and
threatened financial sanctions against Switzerland for its unwillingness to
cooperate with other nations in tax evasion cases.3 1 The United States also
increased pressure on Switzerland and other "tax havens" to modify their
32
approach to tax evasion cases. In response to the international pressure,
on March 13, 2009, the Swiss Federal Council took the landmark step of
announcing that Switzerland now will offer administrative assistance in
individual cases of well-founded suspicion of tax evasion, bringing
Switzerland in line with international standards set forth in the OECD
Model Tax Convention.33 In other words, the Swiss government no longer
will distinguish between tax fraud and tax evasion for purposes of providing
-34international cooperation.
Switzerland's volte-face on cooperating in tax evasion cases has had a
noticeably adverse effect on Swiss banks, particularly smaller banks, which
have relied upon the competitive advantage of Swiss bank secrecy laws to
attract clients.3 5 Since the Swiss government relaxed secrecy laws, some of
28 Swiss Bankers Ass'n, Bank Client Confidentiality,
http://www.swissbanking.org/en/home/dossier-bankkundengeheimnis/dossier-
bankkundengeheimnis-themen-geheimnis.htm (last visited Oct. 18, 2009).
29 See, e.g., Lynnley Browning, A 2ndInquiry Hits UBS, Pressed for 52,000Names, N.Y.
TIMES, Feb. 20, 2009, at BI [hereinafter UBSPressedfor 52,000 Names].
30 Org. for Econ. Cooperation and Dev. [OECD], About OECD,
http://www.oecd.org/pages/0,3417,en_36734052_36734103_1 1 1_1_1,00.html (last visited
Oct. 18, 2009).
31 Pierre Bessard, Op-Ed., Leave Swiss Banks Alone, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 3, 2009, at A21.
32 L. Gordon Crovitz, Information Age: Swiss Banks and the End ofPrivacy, WALL ST. J.,
Mar. 23, 2009, at A13.
3 Swiss Bankers Ass'n, supra note 28; see also OECD, Articles of the Model
Convention with Respect to Taxes on Income and on Capital (Jan. 28, 2003), available at
http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/52/34/1914467.pdf.
34 Swiss Bankers Ass'n, supra note 28. On August 26, 2009, Austria, the remaining
European Union member on the OECD's banking "grey list," moved a step closer to easing
restrictions on sharing information with other nations concerning tax evaders. Austria's
main political parties agreed to pass measures to ease banking secrecy in order to bring
Austria in conformance with OECD standards. Sylvia Westall, Austria's Parties Agree on
Easing Banking Secrecy, REUTERS, Aug. 26, 2009,
http://www.forbes.com/feeds/afx/2009/08/26/afx6817895.html.
3 In an interview with Thomson Reuters, Stephane Garelli, professor of international
business policy at Lausanne University in Switzerland, said, "Those who will suffer are
those smaller organizations in Switzerland and Liechtenstein who were living off banking
secrecy and nothing else. They will struggle and maybe disappear because they only had the
6
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Switzerland's private banks reportedly have experienced a significant loss
36
of clients. Larger, public Swiss banks also may have felt the effects.
Publicly traded Swiss banks such as Julius Baer Holding AG, Bank Sarasin,
and EFG International AG lost at least 10% of stock market value in the
four weeks after the government first lifted secrecy rules on February 18,
2009, which may have been due to the change in policy.37 Some opine that
Switzerland's decision to loosen protection of foreign tax evaders will force
Swiss banks to offer additional services and to establish branches in
countries where their clients reside in order to avoid losing their clients.3 8
Relying on the political stability of Switzerland, Swiss banks may be forced
to concentrate on developing business in emerging and potentially less
stable markets such as China, Russia, and India.39
III. BACKGROUND OF THE UBS MATTER
In 2007, Igor Olenicoff, a California billionaire, pleaded guilty to
criminal tax fraud in the United States in connection with offshore accounts
managed by his former UBS private banker, Bradley Birkenfeld.40  With
information obtained through that investigation, the IRS began to build a
case against Birkenfeld and UBS. In April 2008, a IFand jury indicted
Birkenfeld for conspiring to commit criminal tax fraud, and in June 2008,
Birkenfeld pleaded guilty and agreed to cooP erate with United States
prosecutors in exchange for a reduced sentence. Information provided by
Birkenfeld pointed prosecutors directly to UBS's banking operations in
one product." Jason Rhodes, UBS Tax Deal May Pave Way for Bank's Recovery, REUTERS,
Aug. 19, 2009, http://www.reuters.com/article/GCA-
CreditCrisis/idUSTRE57H4AC20090819 (quoting Stephane Garelli).
36 Crovitz, supra note 32.
3 Dylan Griffiths, Geneva Banks Face 'Creative Destruction' in Losing Secrecy,
BLOOMBERG, Mar. 20, 2009,
http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=20601085&sid=a7QiEJj.PYTs&refer-europe
(citing a March 2009 study by Booz & Co.). More analysis is necessary to determine
whether the stock decline of these banks is correlated to the change in Swiss government
policy.
38 Id.
3 Swiss Banks Court New Markets, supra note 1.
40 Paul Sullivan, UBS and the Diamond Smuggler, PORTFOLIO.COM, Sept. 18, 2008,
http://www.portfolio.com/news-markets/international-news/portfolio/2008/09/18/UBS-
Diamond-Smuggling-Scandal.
41 Indictment, United States v. Bradley Birkenfeld and Mario Staggl, No. 08-60099 (S.D.
Fla. Apr. 10, 2008), available at
http://amlawdaily.typepad.com/amlawdaily/files/Birkenfeldlndictment.pdf
42 See Lynnley Browning, Ex-UBS Banker Pleads Guilty in Tax Evasion, N.Y. TIMES,
June 19, 2008, at C1. In August 2009, Birkenfeld was sentenced to 40 months in prison, 10
months more than requested by prosecutors, and fined $30,000. Erik Larson & Carlyn
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Switzerland.43
On July 1, 2008, the United States District Court for the Southern
District of Florida permitted the IRS to serve a "John Doe" summons on
UBS, seeking bank records in Switzerland for 19,000 United States
residents who maintained accounts offshore with UBS." A Department of
Justice spokesperson conceded that the request was "unprecedented,
particularly for a foreign bank." 45 The summons triggered an immediate
response from UBS, which issued a statement denouncing the move.46 A
spokesperson for the Swiss Federal Office of Justice (Bundesamt Fur
Jilstiz) stated that UBS would violate the Swiss Banking Act if it complied
with the summons and that there would need to be an "indication of further
circumstances" for UBS to comply.47
As matters progressed in the courts, on July 17, 2008, the Permanent
Subcommittee on Investigations in the United States Senate held hearings
on global tax havens. 48 Among the witnesses called to testify was Martin
Liechti, a Swiss UBS executive who had been detained at Miami
International Airport on April 23, 2008, while traveling from Switzerland to
Latin America. Liechti, who oversaw UBS's private wealth management in
North America, asserted his Fifth Amendment right against self-
incrimination in response to questions.4 9 By contrast, Mark Branson, the
chief financial officer of global wealth management and business banking at
UBS, testified that UBS would no longer provide offshore banking to
United States citizens. He indicated that UBS was cooperating with United
States and Swiss authorities to identify clients who had committed tax
fraud."
As legal and political struggles ensued over production of records from
Switzerland, prosecutors moved forward with criminal charges against a
UBS executive and the company itself. On November 6, 2008, federal
prosecutors in Miami unsealed an indictment of Raoul Weil, the chief
executive officer of the UBS division that oversaw the cross-border
43 Larson & Kolker, supra note 42.
44 See Deferred Prosecution Agreement, supra note 5, at 9, para. 13.
45 Sullivan, supra note 40.
46 Id. The UBS statement said: "As we have noted, UBS takes this matter very seriously
and is working diligently with both Swiss and U.S. government authorities, consistent with
Swiss law and the legal frameworks for intergovernmental cooperation and assistance." Id.
47 Id. James Nason, a spokesman for the Swiss Bankers Association, said, "UBS itself
cannot decide to hand over client data because then it would be violating Swiss law" and that
any Swiss bank "waits for instructions from the Swiss authorities." Nason added,
"Switzerland doesn't allow fishing expeditions." David S. Hilzenrath, IRS, Justice Target
Undisclosed Assets In Swiss Accounts, WASH. POST, Nov. 1, 2008, at DO.
48 Sullivan, supra note 40.
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business and world-wide private banking.51 The indictment alleged that
Weil and other unindicted co-conspirators assisted U.S. clients in violating
the United States tax code by failing to report IRS Form 1099 information
to the United States,52 creating offshore structures to conceal the U.S.
clients' accounts from the IRS, and falsifying documents to the IRS.54
The indictment even alleged that Weil and other co-conspirators underwent
training in Switzerland on how to avoid detection in the United States while
traveling on UBS business," and that they avoided travel to the United
States entirely at certain periods.56
On February 18, 2009, UBS entered into a deferred prosecution
agreement with federal prosecutors whereby UBS admitted to helping
United States clients avoid paying taxes. The deferred prosecution
agreement required UBS to pay a $780-million fine and disclose the names
of certain account holders to the IRS . Although the precise number of
account holders is not publicly known because that portion of the agreement
was filed under seal,5 press reports indicate that UBS turned over 250 to
60300 names.
The client names were the subject of a pending request for
administrative assistance that the United States had submitted to the Swiss
Federal Tax Administration (SFTA) pursuant to treaties between
Switzerland and the United States.6 1 UBS was able to disclose the names of
the account holders without violating Swiss law because UBS sought and
obtained permission from the Swiss Financial Market Supervisory
Authority (FINMA).62 FINMA, in consultation with SFTA, ordered UBS
5' Indictment, United States v. Raoul Weil, No. 08-60322 (S.D. Fla. Nov. 6, 2008),
available at
http://www.dailybusinessreview.com/images/newsphotos/51685/WeilIndictment.pdf
[hereinafter Indictment of Raoul Weil].
52 Id. at 2-4, paras. 4, 6-10.
5 Id. at 8, para. 25.
54 Id. at 10, para. 37.
5 Id. at 10, para. 35.
56 Id. at 9, para. 30. Weil failed to appear in court for the first hearing, so the district court
judge declared him a fugitive. Order, United States v. Raoul Weil, No. 08-60322 (S.D. Fla.
Jan. 13, 2009), available at http://amlawdaily.typepad.com/files/weil-fugitive-status.pdf.
57 Deferred Prosecution Agreement, supra note 5.
58 id.
5 Id. at 6, para. 9 and Exhibit E (filed under seal).
60 See, e.g., UBS Pressedfor 52,000 Names, supra note 29.
61 See Bundesverwaltungsgericht [Fed. Admin. Court] Mar. 5, 2009, docket nos. A-
7342/2008 & A-7426/2008 (Switz.); see also supra note 27 and accompanying text.
62 Press Release, Swiss Fin. Mkt. Supervisory Authority [FINMA], FINMA Makes
Possible Settlement Between UBS and the US Authorities and Announces the Results of Its
Own Investigation (Feb. 18, 2009), available at http://www.finma.ch/e/aktuell/Pages/mm-
ubs-xborder-20090218.aspx [hereinafter FINMA Press Release]. FINMA is the new Swiss
government authority that supervises banks, insurance companies, stock exchanges, and
9
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to surrender a limited quantity of client data to the United States
authorities." FINMA relied on Articles 25 and 26 of the Swiss Banking
Act, which it contended gave it the authority and obligation to impose
unspecified preventative measures if it had reasonable grounds to believe a
Swiss bank faced serious liquidity problems.64 Following the transfer, the
United States withdrew its request for assistance.
One day after entering into the deferred prosecution agreement with
UBS, the United States government filed suit against UBS in the U.S.
District Court in Miami to enforce the IRS summons of July 1, 2008, which
would force UBS to reveal the names and account information of now
securities dealers, as well as other financial intermediaries in Switzerland. FINMA
Homepage, About FINMA, http://www.finma.ch/e/finma/Pages/Ziele.aspx (last visited Oct.
18, 2009). On June 22, 2007, the Swiss Parliament approved the Federal Act on the Swiss
Financial Market Supervisory Authority (FINMASA), which gave rise to the creation of
FINMA. The Federal Council ratified the implementing provisions for FINMASA on
October 15, 2007, with the Act entering into full force on January 1, 2009. The Act merged
three bodies-the Federal Office of Private Insurance (FOPI), the Swiss Federal Banking
Commission (SFBC), and the Anti-Money Laundering Control Authority-into the Swiss
Financial Market Supervisory Authority (FINMA). Id.
63 FINMA Press Release, supra note 62. At the same time FINMA ordered the limited
production, it also published the results of an investigation undertaken by the Swiss Federal
Banking Commission (SFBC) related to the matter. Id. The SFBC reprimanded UBS for "a
severe breach of certain provisions of the Swiss Banking Act by individual staff members
and serious shortcomings in dealing with the legal risks associated with its business with
U.S. clients." Id; see also Summary Report, FINMA, EBK Investigation of the Cross-
Border Business of UBS AG with Its Private Clients in the USA (Feb. 18, 2009), available
at http://www.finma.ch/dlaktuell/Documents/kurzbericht-ubs-x-border-20090218-e.pdf.
6 FINMA Press Release, supra note 62. According to the FINMA website,
[T]he FINMA Board of Directors ordered the disclosure of the client data as it
considered this as the only way to avoid the real threat of the US authorities
starting proceedings against the bank, which would have threatened its existence
and seriously worsened its liquidity situation which, in turn, would have impacted
the Swiss economy.
Press Release, FINMA, Comment on the Federal Administrative Court Ruling on the
Furnishing of Bank Client Data to the US Authorities (Jan. 8, 2010), available at
http://www.finma.ch/e/aktuell/Pages/mm-entscheid-bvger-20100108.aspx. On January 8,
2010, a Swiss court ruled that FINMA overstepped its authority, and that the Swiss
government and the parliament are the only bodies with the power to implement such
emergency actions. See Chris V. Nicholson, Swiss Court Says Regulator Broke the Law in
UBS Case, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 9, 2010, at B2. The decision, however, is limited to account
information transferred before the United States and Switzerland entered into the new
information-sharing agreement on March 13, 2009. See supra notes 33-34 and
accompanying text. In other words, it does not appear that the decision will impact future
transfers of customer information. See Nicholson, supra note 64.
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52,000 American customers.66 UBS immediately indicated that it would
challenge the summons.67 The deferred prosecution agreement stated that
the United States "shall not deem UBS's interposing of any defenses,
objections, arguments or the filing of any motions" or "its exhausting of all
available appellate remedies" in connection with the summons to be a
breach of the agreement. 68  However, if UBS lost and exhausted its
appellate remedies, the deferred prosecution agreement would require UBS
to comply with the enforcement of the summons.
On April 30, 2009, UBS filed a fifty-page brief in opposition to the
United States government's petition to enforce the summons. 70 Relying
primarily on the factors set forth in the Restatement of Foreign Relations
Law, UBS argued that the principle of international comity restrained the
court from enforcing the summons.n UBS asserted that Swiss law
prohibited UBS and its employees from complying with the summons and
that enforcing the summons would interfere with the balance struck through
treaties between the United States and Switzerland.72
As the dispute progressed toward a showdown in federal court in
Miami, UBS and the United States government reached an "agreement in
principle" to resolve the dispute.73 The deal required UBS to produce the
names of 4,450 United States citizens-far fewer than the 52,000 names
originally sought-whose accounts are believed to hold as much as $18
billion in assets.74 The agreement did not require UBS to pay a fine. IRS
Commissioner Douglas Schulman said the settlement with UBS was a
"major step forward" in the United States government's efforts to pierce the
veil of bank secrecy, and he warned that "wealthy Americans who have
66 Barrett, supra note 4.
67 See David S. Hilzenrath, Pressure Builds on UBS over Secrecy; U.S. Officials Vow
Tough Action on Tax Havens, WASH. POST, Mar. 5, 2009, at D01. UBS executive Mark
Branson indicated that UBS has disclosed all the information it could about the clients in
question "without subjecting its employees to criminal prosecution in Switzerland." Id.
68 Deferred Prosecution Agreement, supra note 5, at 9, para. 13.
69 id.
70 Brief of UBS AG in Opposition to the Petition To Enforce the John Doe Summons,
United States v. UBS AG, No. 09-20423 (11th Cir. Apr. 30, 2009), available at
http://www.ubs.com/l/ShowMedialindex/crossborder/home?contentld=166528&name=UBS
Brief.pdf.
" Id. at 21-35.
72 Id. at 28-39, 40-45.
7 Egenter, supra note 7.
74 Holman W. Jenkins, Jr., Op-Ed., Does the World Still Need the Swiss?, WALL ST. J.,
Aug. 26, 2009, at A13; Bowley, supra note 7. The agreement required UBS first to provide
the names of the account holders to "an intermediate tax administration in Switzerland for
review." Pender, supra note 9.
75 Egenter, supra note 7. In the second quarter of 2009 alone, money outflows from UBS
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hidden their money offshore will find themselves in a jam.",6  UBS
Chairman Kaspar Villiger justified the disclosure of the names by saying,
"The clients are not just harmless victims. They knew what they wanted to
evade."
On August 19, 2009, the United States and Switzerland ratified an
agreement for further cooperation by the Swiss government in United States
tax evasion prosecutions involving UBS customers. 8 As a practical matter,
UBS required the consent of the Swiss government to avoid running afoul
of Swiss privacy laws. In order to satisfy the Swiss government that the
information could be produced without violating Swiss law, the United
States government identified examples of fraud associated with the 4,450
clients at issue. 79 As a result, the Swiss State Secretary in the foreign
ministry, Michael Ambuehl, opined that the production of the client data
would not violate Swiss law. Switzerland's Foreign Minister, Micheline
Calmy-Rey, went further, saying that data pertaining to other clients could
be produced by UBS to the United States government, provided that the
81data pertained to the same type of tax fraud described in the agreement.
UBS Chairman Villiger cautioned, however, that he did not expect the
agreement would lead to automatic exchanges of client data between
countries in the future.82
The Swiss government had its own financial reasons to allow the
transfer of the client data. At the time of the agreement, the Swiss
government owned a 9% investment in UBS in the form of mandatory
convertible notes.83 The agreement removed a significant contingent
liability looming over the price of UBS's stock, thus paving the way for the
Swiss government to convert its notes to stock and sell the shares for a
profit, which it did so on the day after the settlement was announced.84
Removal of the liability also lessened the likelihood that another bailout by
the Swiss government would be necessary, thus providing the Swiss
76 Bowley, supra note 7.
n Jason Rhodes, UBS Chairman Says Clients "Not Harmless Victims": Report,
REUTERS, Aug. 23, 2009,
http://www.reuters.com/article/newsOne/idUSTRE57M10Q20090823?sp-true [hereinafter
UBS Chairman Says Clients "Not Harmless Victims"].
7 Agreement on the Request for Information from the Internal Revenue Service of the
United States of America Regarding UBS AG, a Corporation Established Under the Laws of
the Swiss Confederation, Aug. 19, 2009, U.S.-Switz., available at
http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-drop/us-swissgovemment-agreement.pdf.
7 Carrick Mollenkam, Stephen Fidler & Laura Saundersubs, Swiss Reach Pact on U.S.
Tax Probe, WALL ST. J., Aug. 1, 2009, at B 1.
80 Egenter, supra note 7.
81 UBS Chairman Says Clients "Not Harmless Victims," supra note 77.
82 id
83 Rhodes, supra note 35.
8 UBS Chairman Says Clients "Not Harmless Victims," supra note 77.
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government with political cover to convert the notes and exit from UBS.
IV. THE APPLICATION OF A CONFLICTS OF LAW ANALYSIS
The dispute over the customer information presented UBS with a
Hobson's choice. On the one hand, if UBS disclosed the account
information to the United States government, UBS and its employees likely
would have faced criminal and civil prosecution in Switzerland. On the
other hand, if UBS exhausted its legal challenges in the United States and
still refused to turn over the information, the U.S. Department of Justice
could have proceeded with the criminal prosecution that had been put on
hold by the deferred prosecution agreement, and the Department of Justice
could have used UBS's admissions of wrongdoing as evidence in the
criminal case.
If the dispute over the client information had not been resolved
through negotiations, the matter would have forced the U.S. District Court
to determine whether United States law enforcement interests trump Swiss
bank secrecy laws. A court resolution ultimately may be required if the
settlement breaks down or if the United States government once again
decides to press for information on additional clients. Indeed, the United
States government has been relentless and has made pursuit of tax offenders
a priority.
In reaching a decision in a dispute involving client records of a Swiss
bank, a U.S. District Court first must determine whether Swiss law would
be violated if the court were to order the production of the information. A
party relying on foreign law to argue that a district court's order violates
principles of international comity bears the burden of demonstrating that the
foreign law bars compliance with the United States order.88 If Swiss law
would be violated by disclosure, a court then would apply the Restatement
(Third) of Foreign Relations Law ("Restatement") to determine whether
principles of international comity require deference to Swiss law.89
85 Rhodes, supra note 35.
86 Swiss Federal Banking Act of 1934, supra note 15, art. 47 and accompanying text.
87 Voreacos & Kolker, supra note 2.
88 In re Grand Jury Proceedings (Shams), 873 F.2d 238, 239-40 (9th Cir. 1989) (citing
United States v. Vetco Inc., 691 F.2d 1281, 1289 (9th Cir. 1981)). International comity is
"the recognition which one nation allows within its territory to the legislative, executive or
judicial acts of another nation, having due regard both to international duty and convenience,
and to the rights of its own citizens or of other persons who are under the protection of its
laws." Hilton v. Guyot, 159 U.S. 113, 164 (1895). In order for there to be an issue of
comity, there must be an actual conflict between the foreign and domestic laws. Hartford
Fire Ins. Co. v. California, 509 U.S. 764, 798 (1993) (citing Socit6 Nationale Industrielle
Arospatiale v. U.S. Dist. Court for S. Dist. of Iowa, 482 U.S. 522, 555 (1987)).
89 See In re Grand Jury Proceedings (Marsoner), 40 F.3d 959, 965 (9th Cir. 1994)
(applying Restatement to determine whether deference should be given to Austrian banking
law over United States law enforcement interests).
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Given the broad protection for banking secrecy under Swiss law,90
UBS likely would have convinced the court that the disclosure of the
information violates Swiss law. 91 Indeed, members of the Swiss
government said that the disclosure would violate Swiss law and warned
UBS against providing the information.9 2 The central issue, therefore,
would have been whether the illegality of compliance with the order under
Swiss law precludes its enforcement in the United States.
Courts in the United States follow the framework set forth in section
403 of the Restatement to evaluate whether international comity precludes
enforcement of an order.94 Under the Restatement, reasonableness is "an
essential element in determining whether, as a matter of international law,
the state may exercise jurisdiction to prescribe."95  The Restatement sets
forth a non-exclusive list of factors to evaluate in determining whether the
court's exercise of jurisdiction is unreasonable.96 These factors are applied
below to the UBS dispute.
A. Restatement Factors Weighing in Favor of Compelling Disclosure
Some factors of the Restatement weigh in favor of ordering UBS to
90 See supra Part II.
91 See Swiss Federal Banking Act of 1934, supra note 15, art. 47 and accompanying text.
92 See supra note 47 and accompanying text. Under the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure, "[iun determining foreign law, the court may consider any relevant material or
source, including testimony, whether or not submitted by a party or admissible under the
Federal Rules of Evidence. The court's determination must be treated as a ruling on a
question of law." FED. R. Civ. P. 44.1. Moreover, "[a]n expert witness [on foreign law] is
not required to meet any special qualifications." 9 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & ARTHUR R.
MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 2444, at 406 (1971).
93 See United States v. Vetco Inc., 691 F.2d 1281, 1288 (9th Cir. 1981).
94 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 403
(1987).
95 Id. § 403 reporter's note 10.
96 Id. § 403(2). The factors set forth in the Restatement are:
(a) the link of the activity to the territory of the regulating state ... ; (b) the
connections, such as nationality, residence, or economic activity, between the
regulating state and the person principally responsible for the activity to be
regulated... ; (c) the character of the activity to be regulated, the importance of
regulation to the regulating state, the extent to which other states regulate such
activities, and the degree to which the desirability of such regulation is generally
accepted; (d) the existence ofjustified expectations that might be protected or hurt
by the regulation; (e) the importance of the regulation to the international political,
legal, or economic system; (f) the extent to which the regulation is consistent with
the traditions of the international system; (g) the extent to which another state may
have an interest in regulating the activity; and (h) the likelihood of conflict with
regulation by another state.
Id.
14
Don't Tread on Me
30:1 (2010)
disclose the names of the 52,000 account holders. The main factor
weighing in favor of compelling disclosure is the "link of the activity to the
territory of the regulating state." 7 The link to the United States appears to
be strong. The summons sought information pertaining to United States
residents under investigation for violating United States tax laws.98 The
government alleged that UBS employees actively solicited clients in the
United States and marketed UBS private banking services as a way for
United States clients to avoid paying taxes.99 UBS employees allegedly
assisted those clients in concealing from the IRS their ownership or
beneficial interest in offshore accounts, and by overt acts such as falsifying
documents that ultimately were filed with the IRS,'00 transferring assets for
clients to offshore accounts,' 0 ' providing credit or debit cards linked to
offshore accounts,10 2 and regularly meeting with clients in the United
States."o'
A second factor in the Restatement examines "the connections, such as
nationality, residence or economic activity, between the regulating state and
the person principally responsible for the activity to be regulated . . ."
The connections between UBS and the United States are strong. UBS has
an enormous presence in the United States. In 2008, UBS managed $38
billion in assets originating at its locations in the Americaso and operated
the world's largest trading floor in Stamford, Connecticut.'06 UBS earned
more revenue in the Americas from 2004 to 2008 than it did in
Switzerland.'0o
97Id. § 403(2)(a). Access to the information by persons in the United States may be one
distinguishing characteristic between situations where courts have ordered production and
situations where courts have not. Courts seem to be more inclined to require production of
documents if the documents can be obtained by persons within the United States. Compare
In re Grand Jury Proceedings (Bank of Nova Scotia), 691 F.2d 1384, 1387 (11th Cir. 1982)
(finding that all banking transactions for the Bahamian branch could be handled by the U.S.
branch) with United States v. First Nat'l Bank of Chi., 699 F.2d 341, 343 (7th Cir. 1983)
(finding that U.S. branch could not access documents in Greek branch).
9 Barrett, supra note 4.
99 See Deferred Prosecution Agreement, supra note 5, at 2, para. 2.
100 Indictment of Raoul Weil, supra note 51, at 10, para. 37.
'0 See Deferred Prosecution Agreement, supra note 5, at 2, para. 2.
102 id.
103 Id According to one commentator, "UBS's sin was trying to market Swiss secrecy
cheaply and widely-too cheaply and widely for others to tolerate." Jenkins, supra note 74.
104 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES §
403(2)(b) (1987).
10s See UBS AG, Annual Report (Form 20-F/A), at 96 (May 21, 2009), available at
http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1 114446/000095012309 0 09 240/y77164e20vfza.ht
m#686.
106 Jenkins, supra note 74.
107 Elena Logutenkova & Joshua Gallu, Swiss Suffer Secrecy Loss to Sustain Money
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Moreover, UBS already had admitted to assisting the conduct at the
crux of the summons. In its petition to support the IRS summons, the
Department of Justice relied considerably on UBS's admissions in the
deferred prosecution agreement that it actively assisted United States
residents in violating United States law. 08  Among the admissions, UBS
admitted to implementing in 2004 a compensation structure designed to
increase contacts between UBS private bankers and United States clients,
many of whom are alleged to have violated United States tax laws.109
B. Restatement Factors Weighing Against Compelling Disclosure
Other factors in the Restatement appear to weigh against compelling
UBS to disclose the information. The strongest factor against disclosure is
"the likelihood of conflict with regulation by another state.""10  The
disclosure of the information squarely conflicts with Swiss Banking Law.
Disclosure, even under compulsion by United States courts, could result in
criminal and civil charges against UBS."' As the Supreme Court of the
United States wrote in a case also involving Swiss laws: "It is hardly
debatable that fear of criminal prosecution constitutes a weighty excuse for
nonproduction, and this excuse is not weakened because the laws
preventing compliance are those of a foreign sovereign."ll2
1os Petition to Enforce John Doe Summons, United States v. UBS AG, No. 09-20423
(S.D. Fla. Feb. 19, 2009), available at
http://www.usdoj.gov/tax/UBSPetition to EnforceJohnDoeSummons.pdf.
10 Id. at 2, para. 6.c. The IRS has attempted to use a John Doe summons to force a bank
to break a foreign country's laws in only one prior instance. In that case, the district court
quashed the summons. See In re Tax Liabilities: John Doe, No. C-88-0137, 92 TNI 26-24
(N.D. Cal. Mar. 11, 1992).
11o RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES §
403(2)(h) (1987). The 1996 Treaty on Double Taxation between the United States and
Switzerland explicitly acknowledges a respect for home country laws and practices. The
treaty provides:
In no case shall the provisions of this Article be construed so as to impose upon
either of the Contracting States the obligation to carry out administrative measures
at variance with the regulations and practice of either contracting state or which
would be contrary to its sovereignty, security or public policy or to supply
particulars which are not procurable under its own legislation or that of the State
making application.
Convention for the Avoidance of Double Taxation with Respect to Taxes on Income, U.S.-
Switz., Oct. 2, 1996, art. 26, para. 3, S. TREATY Doc. No. 105-8 (1997).
"' Trade Dev. Bank v. Cont'l Ins. Co., 469 F.2d 35 (2d Cir. 1972) (explaining that
disclosure by a Swiss bank, even at the direction of a U.S. court, would constitute a violation
of Swiss laws); see also Swiss Federal Banking Act of 1934, supra note 15, art. 47 and
accompanying text.
112 Socidt6 Internationale pour Participations Industrielles et Commerciales, S.A. v.
Rogers, 357 U.S. 197, 211 (1958); see also Motorola Credit Corp. v. Uzan, No. 02 Civ.
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Swiss officials cooperated with the disclosure of 250 to 300 names, but
it is unlikely that the Swiss government would have blessed the broad
disclosure of 52,000 names, particularly where the United States
government formally withdrew its request for assistance following the
agreement reached in the criminal case. 3 Indeed, in the month leading up
to the settlement, the Swiss government went so far as to threaten to seize
the records from UBS to prevent UBS from handing them over to the
United States government."
Similarly, another Restatement factor appears to weigh against
compelling the disclosure. That factor examines "the extent to which
another state may have an interest in regulating the activity.""' Courts
have recognized that "the Swiss interest in bank secrecy is substantial."' 16
As discussed above, Switzerland prides itself in protecting the secrecy of
client banking information." 7  Piercing that secrecy may result in drastic
economic effects to the banking industry in Switzerland.118 As the Supreme
Court of the United States warned, "We cannot have trade and commerce in
world markets . . . exclusively on our terms, governed by our laws, and
resolved by our courts.""'9 Therefore, under the Restatement, Switzerland
clearly has a strong interest in regulating the release of bank information,
and that interest conflicts with a court ordering the disclosure of the
information.
666(JSR)(FM), 2003 WL 203011, at *7 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 29, 2003) (denying a Rule 37 motion
to compel UBS to produce bank records from Switzerland, explaining "[a]mong other
concerns, UBS and its employees might face criminal sanctions if they were to respond to
plaintiffs' subpoena without the authorization of the Swiss court").
113 Cage, supra note 65.
114 Alex Kingsbury, Details of IRS Deal with UBS Expected Friday, U.S. NEWS &
WORLD REPORT, Aug. 5, 2009,
http://www.usnews.com/articles/news/national/2009/08/05/details-of-irs-deal-with-ubs-
expected-friday.html.
"' RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES §
403(2)(g) (1987).
116 See, e.g., Minpeco v. Conticommodity Servs, Inc., 116 F.R.D. 517, 524 (S.D.N.Y.
1987) (declining to enforce subpoena on the ground that it would violate Swiss privacy laws
and subject the defendant to criminal sanctions; "There are several indications that the Swiss
interest in bank secrecy is substantial.").
117 See supra Part II.
118 Logutenkova & Gallu, supra note 107. Smaller Swiss banks traditionally have relied
upon the competitive advantage of Swiss bank secrecy laws to attract clients. After the
Swiss government recently relaxed secrecy laws, Geneva private banks have seen a loss of
clients. See Dylan Griffiths, Geneva Banks Face 'Creative Destruction' in Losing Secrecy,
BLOOMBERG, Mar. 20, 2009,
http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=20601085&sid=a7QiEJj.PYTs&refereurope.
19 M/S Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore Co., 407 U.S. 1, 9 (1972).
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C. Restatement Factors and Considerations that May Have Tipped the Scale
In the UBS dispute, all of the deciding factors under the Restatement
depend on the international importance of enforcing tax laws, particularly
laws against tax evasion. The central factor of the Restatement in this
respect is "the character of the activity to be regulated, the importance of
the regulation to the regulating state, the extent to which other states
regulate such activities, and the degee to which the desirability of such
regulation is generally accepted."12  Two other similar factors are "the
importance of the regulation to the international political, legal, or
economic system," and "the extent to which the regulation is consistent
with the traditions of the international system."1 21
Resolving these factors is not easy because tax laws in the United
States are generally different than those in Europe and because the United
States government had not explained its planned use of the information
pertaining to the 52,000 accounts. Tax evasion, defined as the non-
reporting or the incomplete reporting of income or assets without any
further manipulations, is not a crime in Switzerland, so Swiss banks
traditionally have had no duty to provide information to tax authorities.12
If, on the other hand, a Swiss taxpayer uses fraudulent practices or falsifies
documents, then Switzerland considers the conduct to be tax fraud. 123
The importance that the Swiss government places on the distinction
between tax evasion and tax fraud appears to have eroded in recent years.124
The Swiss government's indication in March 2009 that it now will offer
administrative assistance in individual cases of well-founded suspicion of
tax evasion 25 suggests that enforcing laws against tax evasion may have
become more "generally accepted" around the world.126  Indeed,
Switzerland's announcement coincided with announcements by Austria and
Luxembourg-other European nations with similarly strong bank secrecy
120 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES §
403(2)(c) (1987).
121 Id. § 403(2)(e), (f).
122 Honegger, supra note 13.
123 Id. Some cantons (i.e., Swiss states) treat tax fraud as a crime. Id. The cantons of the
major banking centers of Switzerland (Zurich, Geneva, and Basel) treat tax fraud as a crime.
Id. UBS is headquartered in Zurich and Basel. See UBS Home Page, About Us,
http://www.ubs.com/l/e/about.html (last visited Oct. 18, 2009). Although an individual
Swiss canton may have its own procedural rules that could override the Swiss Federal
Banking Act in a proceeding pending in the canton, a canton procedural rule would not apply
to a proceeding in the United States. See Trade Dev. Bank v. Cont'l Ins. Co., 469 F.2d 35
(2d Cir. 1972).
124 Crovitz, supra note 32.
125 See Swiss Bankers Ass'n, supra note 28; see also OECD, Articles of the Model
Convention with Respect to Taxes on Income and on Capital, supra note 33.
126 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 403(2)
(1987).
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laws-that they will adopt the OECD model.12 7 Singapore, Hong Kong,
Andorra, and Liechtenstein also announced they intend to remove barriers
to sharing tax information.128  These developments in 2009 may tip the
scale in favor of disclosure of foreign information relating to tax evasion in
United States proceedings.
D. Predicting the Court's Ruling
The sine qua non of the Restatement is "reasonableness., 29 The
Restatement inherently provides a significant amount of discretion to the
court to decide what is reasonable. Even if the Restatement factors seem to
tip in favor of disclosure, the court may have viewed the government's
broad, unprecedented request for 52,000 names to be unreasonable. While
courts have compelled disclosure of information protected by foreign bank
secrecy law in discrete circumstances,130 courts generally have rejected
broad discovery that would conflict with foreign law.131 By analogy, even
the OECD model, as interpreted, generally requires a showing of well-
founded suspicion of tax evasion before a country will provide assistance to
a foreign government. 32
127 OECD Centre for Tax Policy and Administration, Improved Tax Cooperation a Boost
to Restoring Financial Confidence Gurria,
http://www.oecd.org/document/54/0,3343,en-2649_33767_42358774_1-1_1_1,00.html (last
visited Oct. 18, 2009).
128 id
129 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 403
reporter's note 10 (1987).
130 See In re Grand Jury Proceedings (Bank of Nova Scotia), 691 F.2d 1384 (11th Cir.
1982) (affirming district court's contempt ruling against Bank of Nova Scotia for failing to
produce records maintained at the bank's main branch or its branch in Bahamas in response
because the bank had not made a good faith effort to comply with the subpoena); United
States v. Davis, 767 F.2d 1025 (2d Cir. 1985) (affirming order requiring disclosure of
information pertaining to four identified individuals); United States v. Vetco Inc., 691 F.2d
1281 (9th Cir. 1981) (affirming order requiring disclosure of information regarding one U.S.
company, its Swiss subsidiary, and its tax accounting firm); Fundacion Museo de Arte
Contemporaneo de Caracas v. CBI-TDB Union Bancaire Privee, No. 93 Civ. 6870 (PKL),
1996 WL 243431, at *2-3 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 9, 1996) (ordering disclosure of information
pertaining to one identified individual); SEC v. Banca Della Svizzera Italiana, 92 F.R.D.
111, 113 (S.D.N.Y. 1981) (ordering that requests be "refined at the Court's suggestion to
target the demanded disclosure in simplest terms").
131 See, e.g., United States v. First Nat'l Bank of Chi., 699 F.2d 341, 343-45 (7th Cir.
1983) (holding that the district court abused its discretion by requiring a U.S. bank to
produce documents from its Greek branch where there was no indication of the rationale for
the district court's decision; remanding for further inquiry); Trade Dev. Bank v. Cont'l Ins.
Co., 469 F.2d 35, 38-40 (2d Cir. 1972) (holding in an insurance dispute that district court
judge did not abuse his discretion in denying motion to compel Swiss bank to produce the
names of account holders where bank officials would face criminal prosecution in
Switzerland and where the names had little importance in the case because other information
was produced).
132 See Swiss Bankers Ass'n, supra note 28; see also OECD, Articles of the Model
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Predicting an outcome in the UBS case is difficult because many of the
facts are not publicly known.1 3 3 On its face, the summons appeared to be
nothing more than an overbroad discovery request, and the surrounding
circumstances suggested the same. Although the government alleged in the
criminal case that UBS and its clients falsified documents, it sought
originally fewer than 20,000 names and ultimately settled for 250 to 300
names. The United States government then curiously withdrew its request
for additional assistance from the Swiss authorities following the receipt of
those names, 13 4 and expressly permitted UBS to raise defenses to the July
IRS summons for the remaining 52,000 names. It is peculiar that
prosecutors did not press for more names while they had the most leverage
over UBS, that is, while an indictment was hanging over UBS's head.
These facts might suggest that the United States government considered the
52,000 account holders to be of lesser importance than the 250 to 300
account holders or that the government lacked a reasonable basis for linking
those 52,000 persons with violations of United States law. The fact that
UBS admitted to assisting United States clients in violating the law hurt its
defense, but it certainly does not mean that all of UBS's private banking
clients in the United States violated the law. The government's success in
obtaining the additional names likely would have hinged on presenting
evidence to the court that those 52,000 clients violated United States
lawl35-something it appeared unable to do as evidenced by the ultimate
settlement for merely 4,450 names. 136 Accordingly, a district court under
the facts likely would have denied the government's motion to compel the
production of information relating to all 52,000 names.1 37
V. CONCLUSION
If the dispute between the United States government and UBS had
been decided by the court, the United States government probably would
not have obtained all 52,000 account names. The government appeared to
lack sufficient evidence of violations by all 52,000 clients to justify its
broad, unreasonable request. Applying the Restatement (Third) of Foreign
Relations Law, the court likely would have ruled that the summons, as
drafted, was overbroad and unreasonable under the circumstances.
Diplomatic actions, however, ultimately worked in the United States
Convention with Respect to Taxes on Income and on Capital, supra note 33.
133 Deferred Prosecution Agreement, supra note 5, at 6, para. 9 and Exhibit E.
134 Cage, supra note 65.
135 See First Nat'I Bank of Chi., 699 F.2d 341.
136 Egenter, supra note 7.
13 It is also within the "sound discretion" of the court to modify the summons. See
Tiberi v. CIGNA Ins. Co., 40 F.3d 110, 112 (5th Cir. 1994); see also FED. R. Civ. P
45(c)(3)(A) ("shall quash or modify"). Even if the court orders production, the court may
narrow the scope based on the evidence the government ultimately proffers to the court.
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government's favor and obviated the need for a decision by the court in this
unique dispute.
Only time will tell whether those diplomatic moves have caused long-
lasting harm to privacy protection in Switzerland. Building on its 2008
decision to abandon its longstanding protections for depositors accused by
their home countries of tax evasion, the Swiss government permitted the
hole in the sacred armor of Swiss bank secrecy to grow even further by
consenting to the production of the 4,450 names. In its purported attempt to
protect Swiss bank secrecy, the Swiss government ultimately may have
proven to be the biggest threat to Swiss privacy.
21

